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“On the ‘hyperinsulation’ and ‘transparency’ of  imaginary 
situations” 
Jérôme Pelletier† 
According to Recanati (2000), imaginary situations may belong at least to two 
different realms: the realm of the fictional and the realm of the ascription of 
beliefs. Let’s call ‘fictional situations’ the imaginary situations of the first realm 
and ‘ascribed situations’ the imaginary situations of the second realm. 
‘Fictional situations’ are imaginary situations one entertains while, for instance, 
playing a game of make-believe, writing fiction or watching a fiction film. 
‘Ascribed situations’ are situations one entertains while metarepresenting in 
thought or in language someone else’s beliefs. Recanati describes ‘ascribed 
situations’ as imaginary situations since, like fictional situations, ascribed 
situations are representations entertained through mental simulation and ‘de-
coupled’ from the actual world1. In what follows, I make a few comments 
concerning the way Recanati analyses imaginary situations in these two realms.  
1 Are fictional situations ‘hyperinsulated’? 
1.1 Recanati’s claim 
According to Recanati, imaginary situations in the fictional realm have the 
property of ‘hyperinsulation’ : 
“There is (…) a general property which distinguishes imaginary 
from real situations (…). The property I have in mind I call 
hyperinsulation. (…) [R]eal situations are insulated from each other 
because the facts which hold in them need not hold outside them. 
Thus if a fact belongs to the nonpersistent variety, it may hold in a 
situation s without holding in a situation s’ comprising s. Persistent 
facts which hold in s will necessarily hold in s’, however. Thus if 
there is a man with a hat in this room, there is a man with a hat in 
the building of which this room is a part. That is because 
existentially quantified facts are persistent, in contrast to universally 
quantified facts. (If everybody is happy in this room, it does not 
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1 Cf. Recanati (2000, 50). 
follow that everybody is happy in the building.) Now, if we turn to 
imaginary situations, we see that even persistent facts holding in 
such situations need not hold in situations comprising them (…). 
Take a book: that is a real world entity which supports a number of 
facts hence can (like any other entity) be construed as a situation. 
Among the facts in question there will be facts concerning who 
authored the book, when it was issued; and so forth, as well as facts 
about the content of the book – the situation which it describes. 
We can therefore distinguish a number of situations ordered by the 
comprise relation. First, we have, say, the reading situation s1 in 
which (let us suppose) I presently find myself, with a certain book 
in my hands. The book in question itself is a situation s2, supporting 
a number of facts (e.g., the fact that there are twelve chapters and 
156 pages). The imaginary situation described in the book is a third 
situation s3. Situation s1 comprises situation s2 which comprises 
situation s3. Now suppose that, in the imaginary situation described 
by the book, there is a man who can fly. We have:  
(2) s1 @<<s2@<<s3 w<<There is a man who can fly>> >> >> 
In other words: it is a fact concerning my present reading situation 
(s1) that it contains a book (s2) which ‘contains’ a situation (s3) in 
which there is a man who can fly. But it does not follow that in my 
present situation s1 there is a man who can fly, even though 
<<There is a man who can fly>> is a persistent fact. It is because s3 
is an imaginary situation (whose factual set is relative to a world w distinct from 
@) that the facts it supports, whether ‘persistent’ or not, do not persist when we 
move upward from that situation to the situations comprising it.  
That is the property which I call hyperinsulation (Recanati, 84; 
emphasis mine).”2  
1.2 A new name for an old fact? 
One may wonder first whether ‘hyperinsulation’ is a new name for an old fact 
concerning fictional truths, i.e., the fact that fictional truths are isolated from 
actual truths. This fact has been put forward most notably by Lewis in ‘Truth 
in Fiction’.  
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In ‘Truth in Fiction’, Lewis suggests to think of a fiction not in the abstract as, 
for instance, a string of sentences but as a story told by a storyteller on a 
particular occasion. Lewis adds that, depending on the world one considers, a 
same story may be told either as fiction or as known fact. In our world –the 
actual world-, storytelling is nothing but pretence. But nothing prevents us to 
consider worlds where the same story that the one which is told as fiction in 
the actual world is told as known fact. On that basis, Lewis presents the view 
that true statements about fiction are true in virtue of the states of affairs in a 
possible world where the story is told as known fact.  
“A sentence of the form “In the fiction f, φ” is true iff φ is true at 
every world where f is told as known fact rather than fiction” 
(Lewis 1978/1983, 268). 
Lewis is also well-known for his modal realism according to which other 
possible worlds are just other flesh-and-blood worlds. Other possible worlds 
are not, for Lewis, in any way, ontologically subordinated to this world, the 
actual world. This is the reason why Lewis attaches a great importance to the 
boundaries between worlds. How then are worlds to be individuated? Lewis 
answers that what separates worlds one from another is spatiotemporal 
disconnection. A world is unified, according to Lewis, by the spatiotemporal 
interrelation of its parts. In other words, if two things are not spatiotemporally 
related, they are not worldmates. All this implies that there does not exist any 
path – either spatiotemporal nor causal - from one world to another3.  
Two consequences of Lewis’s theory of truth in fiction matter for our 
discussion. First consequence: there is no path from a possible world where a 
fiction is told as known fact to the actual world where the same story is told as 
fiction. Second consequence: there is no path between the many possible 
worlds where a fiction is told as known fact. Let’s call ‘fictional world’ a 
possible world where a fiction is told as known fact rather than fiction. For 
Lewis, there is no path either from a fictional world to the actual world or 
between two different fictional worlds. In Recanati’s terminology, Lewis 
claims that fictional worlds are twice ‘hyperinsulated’: they are first 
‘hyperinsulated’ from the actual world and secondly they are ‘hyperinsulated’ 
from each other.  
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1.3 One or two Superman? 
Remember that it is a fact concerning my present reading situation (s1) that it 
contains a book (s2) which ‘contains’ a situation (s3) in which there is a man 
who can fly. Let’s add that the man who can fly is called in the story 
‘Superman’. The hyperinsulation of imaginary situations from the actual world 
entails, according to Recanati, that they need not be in the actual world a man 
who can fly called ‘Superman’. On that basis, the question one wants to raise 
is whether they can be in (s1) a man who can fly bearing the same name as the 
man of whom it is said in (s3) that he can fly. 
To give to this question a more dramatic turn, let’s imagine that one finds in 
my present reading situation (s1) a man who can fly called ‘Superman’ who 
possesses all the characteristics of the man who can fly described in the book 
(s2). Does the hyperinsulation of imaginary situations from the actual world 
entail that, contrary to what it seems to a non-philosopher4, the Superman of 
(s3) and the Superman of (s1) cannot bear the same name?  
A philosopher who would have lost his pre-kripkean innocence would 
certainly claim that the Superman of (s3) being essentially fictional cannot exist 
and, as a consequence, that the nonexistent Superman of (s3) and the existent 
Superman of (s1) cannot and do not bear the same name. For the post-
kripkean philosopher, both names are nothing but homonyms5. On Kripke’s 
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Superman of (s1) do actually bear the same name. Moreover the non-
philosopher would claim that both Superman are the same individual and that, 
after all, the Superman of (s3) exists. 
5 The homonyms mentionned here are different from the ones Kripke has in 
mind when he allows that a name of a fictional object like ‘Superman’ is 
ambiguous between two uses, one of which is parasitic on the other. 
According to Kripke, as the name ‘Superman’ was originally introduced, it has 
no referent whatsoever and it is used all the way in pretense as a name for a 
person. At a later stage, this use in pretense ends up creating a fictional 
character which Kripke conceives as an abstract and existing artifact. In the 
end, this metaphysical move gives rise to a nonpretend use of another name 
‘Superman’ to refer to that existing artifactual entity. In effect, there are for 
Kripke two different names ‘Superman’: one for a person which does not 
exist, one for an existing abstract entity. By contrast, the two names which are 
considered here as homonyms are two names for two different concrete 
individuals who bear different names with the same spelling.  
view, the name ‘Superman’ of the Superman of (s3) is a rigid nondesignator 
designating nothing either in a fictional world or in the actual world6. And the 
name ‘Superman’ of the Superman of (s1), if it designates anything in the 
actual world, rigidly designates, on Kripke’s view, the same individual in every 
possible world in which this individual exists. As a consequence, they cannot be 
in (s1) a man who can fly bearing the same name as the man of whom it is said 
in (s3) that he can fly. 
Note that what has just been said is true only because the Superman of (s3) is a 
native from (s3): the Superman of (s3) does not exist in the actual world and is 
not imported from the actual world into (s3). If this were not the case, if for 
instance the author of the book I am presently reading knew about the 
existence of the Superman of (s1) and intended to tell a fictional story about 
this individual, the Superman of (s3) would then certainly bear the same name 
as the Superman of (s1). Nothing prevents a member of the actual world - for 
instance, a city or a famous individual - to migrate into an imaginary situation. 
Imaginary situations are hyperinsulated from the real world without the real 
world being hyperinsulated from imaginary situations.  
1.4 Fictions within fictions 
If one is ready to admit that Recanati follows Lewis when he claims that 
fictional situations are ‘hyperinsulated’ from the real world, still, one may 
wonder whether Recanati would be ready to follow Lewis and to claim that 
fictional worlds are ‘hyperinsulated’ one from another. In other words, is 
Lewis right when he claims that fictional worlds are ‘hyperinsulated’ one from 
another? 
This last question really matters to any theory of fiction which aims to give an 
account of fictions within fictions. Whenever an author of fiction writes 
fictions within fictions, he or she is led to embed fictional situations within 
other fictional situations. One of the questions which matters in this context is 
whether the so-called property of hyperinsulation applies to embedded 
fictional situations or not. 
To answer this question, let’s construct a follow-up of Recanati’s story about 
the man who can fly. Suppose that the author of the book I am currently 
reading is a postmodern writer who enjoys fictions within fictions. Suppose 
then that, in the imaginary situation described by the book, the man who can 
fly – Superman – is said to be an author of fictional stories. Suppose finally 
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that in the course of writing a book, Superman creates a beautiful woman. We 
have then embedded in the imaginary situation s3 another imaginary situation 
s4 - the book written by Superman - a situation supporting
7 a number of facts 
(the fact that there are 5 chapters and 98 pages). Moreover, we have the 
imaginary situation s5 described by the book written by Superman, an 
imaginary situation which supports among other facts the fact that there is a 
beautiful woman who, let’s say, is called ‘Sarah’, the factual set of s5, w’, being 
different from the factual set of s3, w. We have in Recanati’s symbolism: 
(3) s1 @<<s2@<<s3 w<<There is a man who can fly who is called 
‘Superman’ and writes a book<< s4w<< s5w’<<There is a beautiful woman 
who is called ‘Sarah’>> >> >> >> 
In these new circumstances, it is a fact concerning my present reading 
situation (s1) that it contains a book (s2) which ‘contains’ a situation (s3) in 
which there is a man called ‘Superman’ who can fly and writes a book (s4) 
which ‘contains’ a situation (s5) in which there is a woman called ‘Sarah’ who is 
beautiful. Still it does not follow that there is a beautiful woman called ‘Sarah’ 
neither in my present reading situation s1, nor in the imaginary situation s3 
described by the book I am reading even though <<There is a beautiful 
woman called ‘Sarah’>> is a persistent fact. It looks then as if imaginary 
situations in the fictional realm still have the property of ‘hyperinsulation’, 
even when they contain other imaginary situations embedded in themselves. 
Lewis’s theory seems vindicated and it seems that Recanati would be justified 
if he followed Lewis all the way and claimed that fictional worlds are 
‘hyperinsulated’ one from another. 
1.5 A ‘metaleptic’ meeting 
Still one may wonder whether it is possible to generalise what has just been 
said to all instances of fictions within fictions. Consider a fiction containing 
another fiction (as in the last example) but in which the author allows some of 
the characters belonging to the embedded fiction to meet some other 
characters from the embedding fiction. Actually there exist many fictions 
which allow the boundary between embedded and embedding fictions to 
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following way: “Whenever a fact σ holds in a situation s, or equivalently, 
whenever a proposition is true at s, we say that the situation in question 
supports the fact or proposition. In symbols: [s]σ (Recanati, 64)”. 
dissolve8. It is relatively easy to construct a fiction of this kind. It suffices to 
continue the preceding story a little further. Suppose now that in the 
imaginary situation (s5) described in the book (fictionally) written by 
Superman, Superman falls in love with the beautiful Sarah and makes her 
pregnant9. This an instance of what Genette labels “metalepsis”. Metalepsis is 
defined as: 
“[…] any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator or narratee into the 
diegetic universe (or by diegetic characters into a metadiegetic universe, 
etc.), or the inverse (as in Cortazar)[…]” (Genette 1980, 234-235) 
In our example, Superman is the (fictional) extradiegetic author of a particular 
fiction (s5) in which he himself intervenes. Superman who, in the embedding 
fiction (s3), is said to be the author of a story about a character called ‘Sarah’, is 
also said in an embedded fiction (s5) to make pregnant his own character. Let’s 
call ‘metaleptic’ a fiction which has the following two characteristics :  
1. It contains embedded in itself at least another fiction.  
2. At least one character in the fiction is said to intervene at a particular level 
of the fiction at which this character is not a native.  
The story (fictionally) written by Superman is an instance of a ‘metaleptic’ 
fiction. Metaleptic fictions create a problem for theories of truth fiction in the 
style of Lewis’s theory. If the possible worlds in which a fiction is truthfully 
told are entirely isolated one from another or, in Recanati’s terminology, 
entirely ‘hyperinsulated’ one from another, it becomes difficult if not 
impossible to find a possible world in which a metaleptic fiction would be 
truthfully told. In fact, metaleptic fictions would require to admit an overlap 
of fictional worlds and, also, the existence of trans-world individuals. In order 
to give an analysis of the fictional truth that Superman meets Sarah and makes 
her pregnant, one should allow that different fictional worlds (s3) and (s5) have 
parts in common or that Superman, and maybe also Sarah, exist in (s3) as well 
as in (s5). But Lewis’s modal realism is a modal realism without overlap of 
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fictional author, Dermot Trellis, creates the beautiful Sheila Lamont. Sheila 
Lamont is so beautiful that Trellis is said in the fiction to ravish her and to 
make her pregnant. On this example, see Le Poidevin (1995, 230-1). 
worlds and Lewis’s counterpart theory is not a trans-world identity theory10. A 
metaleptic fiction is, for Lewis’s style theories of truth in fiction and modal 
realism, an instance of an impossible fiction. 
1.6 Are ‘metaleptic’ fictions too unorthodox? 
It is likely that, in order to make his case, an adept of Lewis’s theory of truth 
in fiction and modal realism might object that metaleptic fictions are too 
bizarre and unorthodox to be analysed in the same way as normal fictions. 
According to this objection, the fact that it is impossible to find a possible 
world in which a metaleptic fiction would be truthfully told does not 
constitute a real difficulty for Lewis’s possible worlds analysis of true 
statements about fiction. If there is a real problem here, it lies with metaleptic 
fictions themselves which, according to the objection, break the rules of 
fiction, not with Lewis’s analysis of truth in fiction. 
To this objection, one may reply that metaleptic fictions may also be 
considered as the modern follow-ups of those fictions in which a narrator 
enters into the narrated world. The reply, relying on Genette’s definition of 
metalepsis, suggests that there is a continuity between metaleptic fictions in 
which a character intervenes into a narrated world and fictions in which the 
narrator enters into the narrated world, for instance to comment on it or to 
invite the narratee to enter himself or herself into the narrated world. Here are 
some examples of fictions in which a narrator enters into the narrated world: 
“Leaving it [the coach] to pursue its journey at the pleasure of the 
conductor aforementioned […] this narrative may embrace the 
opportunity of ascertaining the condition of Sir Mulberry Hawk, 
and to what extent he had, by this time, recovered from the injuries 
consequent on being flung violently from his cabriolet, under the 
circumstances already detailed” (Dickens, 1982, ch. 38, inside the 
chapter) 
“He stretched himself. He rose. He stood upright in complete nakedness 
before us, and while the trumpets pealed Truth! Truth! We have no 
choice left but confess – he was a woman.  
The sound of the trumpets died away and Orlando stood stark naked. 
No human being, since the world began, has ever looked more ravishing. 
[…] Orlando looked himself up and down in a long looking-glass, 
without showing signs of discomposure, and went, presumably, to his 
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bath. 
We may take advantage of this pause in the narrative to make 
certain statements. Orlando has become a woman – there is no 
denying it.” (Woolf 1989 137-8) 
“Mrs. Tow-wouse […] began to compose herself, and at length 
recovered the usual serenity of her temper, in which we will leave her, 
to open the reader the steps which led to a catastrophe, common 
enough […] yet often fatal to the repose and well-being of families, and 
the subject of many tragedies, both in life and on stage [i.e. adultery].” 
(Fielding, Joseph Andrews I, xvii) 
“As we have now brought Sophia into safe hands, the reader will, I 
apprehend, be contented to deposit her awhile, and to look a little 
after other personages, and particularly poor Jones, whom we have 
left long enough to do penance for his past offences, which, as is the 
nature of vice, brought sufficient punishment upon him themselves.” 
(Fielding, Tom Jones, Book XI, end)11 
It’s been a long time since fiction writers have included in their narrative an 
extra-fiction concerning the narration itself. Those fictions have become 
classic. This extra-fictional move on the side of fiction writers requires to 
consider the narrative itself as an embedded fiction and the narration itself as 
an embedding fiction. The extracts which have just been mentionned show 
that the narrator who belongs to the embedding fiction is sometimes said to 
enter – or, as in the last extract, to intervene - into the embedded fiction, the 
narrated world. What is remarkable is that these metaleptic passages in no way 
disrupt the fictional involvement of the reader. Once again they are 
considered as classic. 
It is true that our story about Superman and Sarah represents the intrusion 
not of a narrator but of a character belonging to an embedding fiction into an 
embedded fiction. And this certainly makes a difference with the extracts just 
mentioned. Still one may easily find a continuity between metaleptic fictions 
of this kind and fictions in which, as in the extracts mentioned, the narratee is 
invited to make-believe that he can deposit some personages and look at other 
personages. As soon as one admits that there is such a continuity, the 
objection concerning the unorthodox status of metaleptic fiction is weakened. 
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2 Metarepresentation and transparency12 
2.1 Recanati’s ‘transparency thesis’ 
According to Recanati, when a speaker characterizes how the world is 
according to somebody’s beliefs, he does not characterize the actual world 
but, through mental simulation, someone else’s belief world. In saying ‘John 
believes that Morocco is a Republic’, the speaker characterizes John by 
describing the world as it is according to him and the function of the prefix 
‘John believes that…’ is to shift the world with respect to which the fact 
represented at the primary level ‘Morocco is a Republic’ is evaluated13. On 
that basis, Recanati claims that what I call ‘ascribed situations’ are imaginary 
situations in the following sense : 
“In metarepresentations, the fact represented at the primary level is 
located in the imaginary realm rather than in the actual world” (Recanati 
2000, xiv). 
According to Recanati, metarepresentations are intrinsically simulative. The 
simulative essence of metarepresentations follows from the intuitive 
observation that in order to metarepresent, to have a second level belief about 
a first level belief, one needs to display the content believed - the ‘ascribed 
situation’ - at the first level. This is what Recanati calls the ‘iconic’ dimension 
of metapresentations. Metarepresentations are ‘iconic’ in so far as they 
resemble or replicate the beliefs they are about14. The linguistic format of our 
belief reports, the way belief reports are displayed, is then be, for Recanati, 
another evidence in favour of the simulation theory of metarepresentations. 
The ‘iconic’ dimension of metarepresentations in turn explains why the 
ascriber needs first to entertain the content of the first-level representation he 
or she attributes to the ascribee. This last move leads Recanati to claim that 
metarepresentations are ‘transparent’ representations. Metarepresentations do 
not constitute an opaque interface between the ascriber and the ascribee’s 
thoughts since the ascriber needs to entertain the semantic content of the 
representation he attributes - the ‘ascribed situation’ - to the other person. In 
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my terminology, ‘ascribed situations’ are, for Recanati, transparently 
represented.  
In all these moves, Recanati relies on the syntactic format of indirect discourse 
to deduce some of its semantic properties: the iconic presence in the 
metarepresentation at the syntactical level of the object representation or 
‘ascribed situation’ entails, for Recanati, that in order to attribute a belief one 
needs first to entertain the semantic content of the ascribee’s belief. This is 
the ‘transparency thesis’, the fact that whichever state of affairs the object 
representation represents, the metarepresentation also represents: whenever a 
meta-representation displays the content x of an object-representation, then 
the metarepresentation is bound to be about x. According to Recanati, a 
genuine metarepresentation dS (where d is the tag and S the radical) satisfies 
the following schema:  
“Schema (I): 
One cannot entertain the proposition that dS without entertaining 
the proposition that S. 
For example: 
One cannot entertain the proposition that John believes that grass 
is green without entertaining the proposition that grass is green.” 
(Recanati 2000, 10) 
2.2 An empathetic conception of simulation? 
Recanati’s proposal has for it a pre-philosophical intuition about the truth of 
our belief reports. According to that intuition, a true belief report contains a 
that clause whose terms have the same references as the ones used by the subject 
of the report. As is well-known, this pre-philosophical intuition goes against 
what has now become the standard Fregean philosophical intuition according 
to which the that-clause of a belief report has to express some sort of 
conceptual content that the subject of the report believes in order for the 
report to be true. To use Davidson’s phrase, Recanati tries to recover this 
‘pre-Fregean semantic innocence’15.  
Recanati’s proposal has also for it a long philosophical tradition when he 
stresses the vital role of simulation in belief reports and metarepresentations. 
In the now classic debate in the philosophy of mind about the cognitive 
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mechanisms involved in ‘mindreading’16, the ‘theory theorists’ claim that the 
ability to think about other’s mental states can be explained by our (maybe 
tacit) possession of a theory of the structure and functioning of the mind 
while the ‘simulation-theorists’ maintain that the ability to understand the 
mind of others is grounded in our ability to engage in mental simulation. 
Recanati is a friend of simulation theory. As other simulationists, Recanati has 
behind him a long philosophical history going back as far as Vico, Dilthey and 
Weber, an history which has recently enjoyed a resurgence in Quine (1960), 
Goldman (1989) and, most notably, in Gordon (1986)17. 
What is mental simulation? It is an exercise of the imagination commonly 
described as putting oneself or imagining being ‘in someone else’s shoes’. At 
least, two steps are involved in a simulation:  
1. In this imaginary move, the simulator finds himself having certain feelings, 
certain beliefs and desires, he finds himself choosing a certain course of 
action…  
2. The simulator is then in a position to judge that the simulatee is actually 
having such and such states, similar or at least analogous to the simulator’s 
own imaginary states. 
Is there in this very general description of an exercise of mental simulation 
some grounds in favour of Recanati’s ‘transparency thesis’? It is said in this 
general description that the process occurring in the simulator models the 
process occurring in the simulatee, or that the simulator uses his own mental 
states to represent another’s mental states. But nowhere it is said, contrary to 
Recanati’s claim, that the simulator literally thinks what the simulatee thinks. 
Generally, it is said that when we engage in mental simulation, we attribute 
psychological states to others on the basis of our experience of the same 
psychological states, or at least similar or corresponding or analogous ones. All 
these phrases point towards the presence of a non-transparent or opaque 
ingredient in simulation. Simulation theory, as it is traditionally conceived, is 
non-transparent. Let’s quote Goldman: 
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& Proust (2002). 
17 On the philosophical antecedents of simulation theory, see Goldman (1995, 
188-9). 
“Let us (…) describe the simulation heuristic (…). The initial step is (…) 
to imagine being “in the shoes” of the agent (…). This means pretending 
to have the same initial desires, beliefs, or other mental states that the 
attributor’s background information suggests the agent has. The next 
step is to feed these pretend states into some inferential mechanism, or 
other cognitive mechanism, and allow that mechanism to generate 
further mental states as outputs by its normal operating procedure. For 
example, the initial states might be fed into the practical reasoning 
mechanism which generates as output a choice or decision. (…) More 
precisely, the output state should be viewed as a pretend or surrogate 
state, since presumably a simulator doesn’t feel the very same affect or 
emotion as a real agent would. Finally, upon noting this output, one 
ascribes to the agent an occurrence of the output state (Goldman 1995, 
189)”. 
Goldman rightly stresses that presumably a simulator doesn’t feel the very same 
affect or emotion as a real agent would. One should add, following Goldman, 
that presumably a simulator doesn’t think the very same thought as the 
simulatee. On that basis, one may doubt that simulation is as transparent and 
innocent as Recanati apparently believes it is. Actually, the very opposite may 
be true. Of course, it may happen that the shoes that the simulator occupy are 
enough like those of the simulatee. In these circumstances, as Recanati 
suggests, the simulator can metarepresent in a transparent and innocent way. 
But one may wonder whether, in these particular circumstances, the 
simulation of the ascriber involves an imaginative experiment since, in these 
circumstances, imagining may not be necessary to think what the other thinks.  
Following simulationists like Goldman, Recanati claims that one needs to put 
oneself into someone else’s shoes in order to entertain a genuine 
metarepresentation. But, unless one follows radical simulationists like Gordon 
and adopts contra Goldman what may be called an empathetic conception of 
simulation, the former claim does not by itself entail Recanati’s ‘transparency 
thesis’, that is the thesis that the ascriber needs to think what the ascribee 
thinks.  
There is here a risk of confusion between two different imaginative projects 
which may be involved in an exercise of simulation. To put oneself into 
someone else’s shoes in the manner of Goldman is a very different 
imaginative project from the project of thinking what someone else thinks in 
the manner of Recanati. The main difference between the two imaginative 
projects is, according to Wollheim (1984, 76), that while the former leaves it 
open to the simulator at any moment to imagine himself being face to face 
with the simulatee, the latter rules out such possibility18. The distinction 
between these two projects is present in the phrase ‘Imagining being X’ 
which, at the conceptual level, is an ambiguous phrase. Its sense can vary 
between two extremes, from ‘imagining oneself in X’s place’ to ‘imagining that 
one is X rather than oneself’19. Only the latter project rules out for the imaginer 
to imagine being brought face to face with X. Following Mackie (1977), 
Goldie (1999) notes that what is characteristic of the modest  ‘imagining being 
X’ in the sense of ‘imagining oneself in X’s place’ is that, contrary to what is 
required by empathy, it involves a mixture of the imaginer’s properties and of 
the X’s properties20. And I believe an exercise of simulation – as it is 
traditionally conceived in simulation theory – shares many more 
characteristics with the modest imaginative project rather than with the other.  
As a conclusion, I suggest that Recanati’s conception of simulation is an 
empathetic conception. Only such a conception can motivate Recanati’s 
‘transparency thesis’ for it is only through a process like empathy that the 
ascriber can lose sight that he or she has a different point of view than the 
ascribee. For Recanati, empathy is a process by which a person imagines, not 
only the emotions and affects of another person, but also the thoughts of 
another person. But whereas there is no doubt that some degree of empathy is 
needed to detect someone else’s affects and emotions, one may wonder 
whether the same mechanism is at work to ascribe beliefs to someone else.  
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